Do banks use credit default swap hedging to substitute for loan sales? By tracking banks' lending exposures and CDS positions on individual firms, we find that banks use CDS hedging to complement rather than to substitute for loan sales. Consequently, bank loan sales are higher for firms that are actively traded in the CDS market. In addition, we find evidence that suggests that banks sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales. This study employs identification strategies similar to the "twin study" design to separate the effects of borrower-side and lender-side factors, and to minimize the omitted-variables bias.
Winton (2013)), which raises the question of whether banks use CDS hedging to substitute for loan sales. For instance, if a bank buys CDS protection to hedge its lending exposure to a firm, it may have less incentive to cut its lending exposure to that firm. Therefore, the ability to hedge through CDS reduces the need to sell a loan in the secondary market. On the other hand, banks can also sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales to investors unwilling to hold credit risk (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) ). To this end, the ability to hedge through CDS increases the demand in the secondary loan market. In this study, we examine whether banks use CDS contracts to substitute for or to facilitate loan sales using new data that track each bank's lending exposure in each syndicated credit facility over time.
Data limitations create major impediments in empirical studies on banks' CDS uses and loan sales. For instance, researchers on corporate loan sales rely on the Loan Syndications and
Trading Association (LSTA) mark-to-market pricing database, which collects only loan bid and 1 A CDS contract is a credit derivative contract that transfers the default risk of one or more reference entities from the protection buyer to the protection seller. The data used in our study overcome some of these aforementioned limitations. Our main data come from the Shared National Credit (SNC) Program, an interagency effort established in 1977 to provide a periodic credit risk assessment of large syndicated credits held by federally supervised financial institutions. Importantly, the SNC data track each lender's exposure in each syndicated credit facility in each year. A lender's exposure to a facility is its share commitment, which is the total amount that a lender has legally committed to a syndicated credit facility.
Specifically, a lender's exposure to a facility includes both utilized and unutilized commitments to the facility.
We define a variable, exposure cut, as an approximate measure of loan sales. Specifically, a lender's exposure cut on a facility is the difference in its lending exposure to the facility between the previous year and the current year. A positive exposure cut generally implies that a lender 3 has sold part or all of its exposure to a facility in the secondary market. 3 Since positive exposure cuts can occasionally be caused by loan amendments, we explicitly control for loan amendments in our analyses. Therefore, our approximate measure of loan sales reflects a significant improvement over measures used in previous studies.
We further employ identification strategies similar to the "twin study" design 4 to separate the effects of borrower-side and lender-side factors, and to minimize the omitted-variables bias. One main empirical challenge in evaluating a bank's decision to sell loans is the difficulty in separating the effects of borrower-side factors from those of lender-side factors. For instance, a bank can sell loans because the risk of its borrowers has escalated, or because it has encountered a liquidity shock. Consequently, the estimated results will be biased if one does not properly control for either the borrower-side or the lender-side effects. Additionally, a researcher may either be unaware of or lack access to all relevant variables, so the omitted-variables bias could also arise. To overcome these problems, we employ two identification strategies: The first identification strategy allows us to focus on the effects of borrower-side factors without worrying about lender-side factors, and the second identification strategy allows us to focus on the effects of lender-side factors without worrying about borrower-side factors.
These identification strategies leverage one prominent feature of syndicated lending: Each syndicated facility has multiple lenders, and each lender participates in multiple facilities. To control for lender-side factors, we compare exposure cuts on different facilities by the same 3 A lender's exposure to a facility includes both utilized and unutilized commitments. Principal and interest payments change the utilized commitment but not the total commitment. In other words, principal and interest payments do not lead to positive exposure cuts. 4 Because identical twins share nearly 100% of their genes, most differences between them are due to their environments. 4 lender in the same year. To this end, we include the lender-time fixed effects, which are lender fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved lender-side factors, and macroeconomic factors. Likewise, to control for all borrower-side factors, we compare exposure cuts by different lenders on the same facility in the same year. Specifically, we include the facility-time fixed effects, which are facility fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved facility-level factors, firm-level factors, and macroeconomic factors.
We perform additional analyses using a secondary sample obtained through linking the SNC data with a data set from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC data set tracks the weekly CDS positions on each reference entity for each of the six largest banks in the United States. By linking the SNC data with the DTCC data, we can examine the relationship between a bank's exposure cut and its CDS positions on the same firm.
We find that banks' exposure cuts are higher on firms that are actively traded in the CDS market. Additionally, a bank's exposure cut on a firm is higher if the bank has also bought CDS on that firm. These findings do not support the view that banks use CDS hedging to substitute for loan sales, but rather suggest that banks tend to use CDS hedging and loan sales concomitantly.
Moreover, we find a positive and significant correlation between a bank's exposure cut and its sold CDS protection on the same firm, which suggests that banks are likely to sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales to investors unwilling to bear credit risk.
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to examine the relationship between U.S. large banks' use of CDS and loan sales using data that track each bank's lending exposures on individual firms. Our study complements that of Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) The DTCC data are also used in a few recent studies that have different focuses, empirical designs, or sample periods than ours. Among these studies, Choi and Shachar ((2014)) focus on CDS-bond basis trades, and Shachar ((2012)) examines the impacts of the daily aggregate order 6 imbalance on CDS spreads. Siriwardane ((2015) ) studies the relationship between concentrated capital losses of CDS sellers and changes in CDS spreads, and Gehde-Trapp, Gündüz, and Nasev (2015) focus on the liquidity premium in CDS transactions. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) examine the hedging and speculation motives of CDS trading, and Gündüz et al. (2015) focus on a sample of German banks and firms. Our study complements these studies by focusing on whether large U.S. banks use CDS to substitute for or facilitate loan sales.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data and empirical design.
Section II presents and discusses the estimation results, and Section III concludes.
I. Data and methods

A. Data
We construct two data samples. by the agent bank. Each facility in the SNC data is assigned an internal risk rating, which is one of the five regulatory rating categories with increasing levels of credit risk: "pass", "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful" and "loss". Specifically, the "pass" rating indicates that a facility is in good standing with little credit risk. On the other hand, the "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful", and "loss" ratings are broadly referred to as "criticized" ratings that indicate elevated levels of default risk.
At the lender-facility level, each observation is identified by a facility identifier, a lender identifier, and a year variable (e.g., a lender-facility-year triple), and contains information about each lender's committed amount and utilized amount for each facility in each year. The SNC database includes each lender's RSSD_ID, the primary identifier for the bank holding company (BHC) and commercial bank databases. Therefore, we use the RSSD_ID field to link the SNC data with these databases. We aggregate lenders to the top holder level. Therefore, except for stand-alone banks, lenders are defined at the BHC level.
The data set from the DTCC contains the weekly CDS positions on each reference entity for The secondary sample is an annual panel data sample of lender-borrower pairs. Each observation in this sample contains a lender's syndicated lending exposure to a borrower in the fourth quarter of each year. For a subset of lender-borrower pairs that are matched with the DTCC data, each observation also contains the lender's notional amounts of bought CDS protection, sold CDS protection, and net CDS protection on the firm in the fourth quarter of the same year. Therefore, we can use the secondary sample to examine the relationship between a bank's CDS trading positions on a given firm and its exposure cut to the same firm.
B. Definition of exposure cut in the primary sample
For regressions based on the primary sample, the dependent variable is exposure cut, which is the difference in a lender's lending exposure to a facility between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t:
Exposure cut Lender-facility exposure Lender-facility exposure ,
where i, j, and t index facilities, banks, and time. According to this definition, a lender's exposure cut on a facility is positive if the lender reduces its exposure to the facility. Although exposure cuts can occasionally be caused by loan amendments, they are generally caused by loan 9 sales. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, we specifically control for loan amendments in our analyses.
C. Empirical design that controls for lender-side factors
Analogous to the classic "twin study" design in behavioral genetics, we can control for lender-side factors by comparing exposure cuts on different facilities by the same lender in the same year. Specifically, we include the lender-time fixed effects to absorb the effects of lenderlevel and macroeconomic variables. This identification strategy allows us to focus on the effects of borrower-side factors without worrying about the lender-side factors. Specifically, the regression design can be summarized using the following equation:
, , • (Borrower-level variables) ,
where i, j, k, and t index facilities, lenders, firms, and time.
Using an empirical design similar to Ashcraft and Santos ( Facility-level variables include credit line, amended facility, and high-risk internal rating. A syndicated credit facility can be either a loan facility (e.g., term loan) or a credit line facility (e.g., revolving or non-revolving credit). We use the credit line dummy to capture the difference in exposure cuts between loan and line facilities. Specifically, the credit line dummy variable equals one if a facility is a credit line and zero if a facility is a loan facility.
As mentioned before, exposure cuts can occasionally be caused by loan amendments. To differentiate exposure cuts caused by loan sales from those caused by loan amendments, we create a dummy variable, amended facility, which equals one if a facility was amended between year t-1 and year t. Therefore, this dummy captures the effects of loan amendments.
A bank's exposure cut on a facility can also be driven by the bank's private information about the credit risk of this facility. To control for the private information effects, we employ the high-risk internal rating dummy, which equals one if a facility has one of the following "criticized" internal risk ratings: "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful" and "loss".
We use two variables to measure the lender-facility relationship. The agent lender dummy indicates whether the lender is the agent for a given facility, and Lender-facility exposure is a lender's share commitment to a facility (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). Finally, lenderborrower exposure is the sum of a lender's exposure to all facilities of a given lender-borrower pair, which is used as a measure for the lender-borrower relationship.
The borrower-level explanatory variables include a firm's trailing 12-month stock return, firm size, leverage, earning-to-asset ratio, tangibility, current ratio, Altman's Z, and Tobin's Q.
In addition, we create a dummy variable, investment-grade firm, to indicate whether a firm has an investment-grade credit rating (i.e., a long-term S&P rating above BBB-). We calculate the distance-to-default measure using Merton's model (Bharath and Shumway (2008)).
D. Empirical design that controls for borrower-side factors
To control for borrower-side factors, we compare exposure cuts by different lenders on the same facility in the same year. We do so by including the facility-time fixed effects, which control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved facility-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic factors. As a result, we can focus on the effects of lender-side factors without worrying about borrower-side factors. Specifically, the regression design can be summarized using the following equation:
, , , ) ,
where i, j, k, and t index facilities, banks, firms, and time. The variable, bank net CDS ratio, is the ratio of the net notional amount of bought CDS protection to total assets. It is an aggregate measure of a bank's hedging activities.
We include lender-level variables commonly used in the existing literature (Berger et al. is a measure of bank securitization activities. Finally, bank size is a measure of size effects, or the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) factor.
E. Empirical design for estimations on the secondary sample
For regressions based on the secondary sample, the definition of exposure cut is slightly different:
, , ,
Exposure cut Lender-borrower exposure Lender-borrower exposure ,
where k, j, and t index borrowers, lenders, and time. The regression design can be summarized using the following equation: 
where k, j, and t index borrowers, lenders, and time.
We use two sets of lender-borrower CDS position variables in the regressions. First, we create two dummy variables to indicate whether a lender is a net protection buyer (net CDS buyer) or a net protection seller on a borrower (net CDS seller). Using these variables, we can run regressions on the entire sample and examine whether the coefficients of these variables are significant. For a subsample of lender-borrower pairs in which the lender holds CDS positions on the firm, we include the net CDS protection and the sold CDS protection of a lender on a borrower to examine the effects of these positions on exposure cut.
We use agent lender and lender-borrower exposure to measure the lender-borrower relationship, and we use high-risk internal rating to measure a lender's private information about a borrower. The high-risk internal rating dummy equals one if any facility of the borrower has one of the following "criticized" internal ratings: "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful"
and "loss". Finally, we include lender-time fixed effects to absorb the combined effects of 13 observed and unobserved lender-level factors, as well as macroeconomic factors.
II. Results
The empirical results are reported in four subsections. Section A reports the summary statistics. Section B estimates the relationship between banks' CDS uses and loan sales by comparing exposure cuts on different facilities by the same lender in the same year. Section C compares exposure cuts by different lenders on the same facility in the same year. Section D reports the estimation results based on the secondary sample.
A. Summary statistics
The Table II reports the summary statistics of the observations included in the primary sample as well as those of the excluded observations. A lender-facility observation is included in the final sample if the following three conditions are met: First, the facility has at least two distinct lenders; second, the lender filed a FR-Y9C or a Call Report; and third, the borrower of the facility can be matched using Compustat. The resulting final sample consists of 129,180 lender-facility-year observations, including 402 lenders, 2,718 borrowers, and 10,158 facilities. There are 1,736 observations excluded from the final sample, accounting for 1.34% of the total number of observations, and 0.80% of the total lending exposure in the original sample. Finally, the minimum number of distinct lenders for each facility in the final sample is 2, and the median is 8. Panel B of Table II suggest that banks' exposure cuts on CDS-active firms were smaller during and after the financial crisis than before the crisis.
B. Comparing exposure cuts by the same bank on different facilities
In regression (3), we control for the differences between firms with and without investmentgrade ratings. As this regression shows, the coefficient of investment-grade firm is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that banks' exposure cuts are smaller on firms with investment-grade ratings than on firms without investment-grade ratings. Furthermore, the coefficient of CDS active firm*Investment-grade firm is also negative and statistically significant, suggesting that banks' exposure cuts are even smaller when firms with investmentgrade ratings are actively traded in the CDS market.
In regression (4), we control for the differences between firms with and without high-risk internal ratings. If a facility receives a high-risk internal rating, the bank observes the deterioration of credit quality of that facility. Therefore, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of high-risk internal rating suggests that banks' exposure cuts are higher on firms with deteriorating credit quality. Further, the coefficient of CDS active firm*high-risk internal rating is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that banks' exposure cuts are even higher when firms with high-risk internal ratings are actively traded in the CDS market.
Regression (5) controls for the differences between amended facilities and facilities that have not been amended. As described in Section 2, the amended facility dummy variable equals one if the facility was amended during the period from year t-1 to year t. As this regression shows, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of amended facility suggests that banks' exposure cuts are larger on amended facilities than on facilities that have not been amended. Furthermore, the coefficient of CDS active firm*Amended facility is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that banks' exposure cuts on amended facilities are even higher when the borrowers are actively traded in the CDS market.
Among other control variables, we find that banks' exposure cuts are smaller on firms with high stock returns, high profit margins, stable collateral, or high market valuation, as the coefficients of firm stock return, firm earning-to-asset ratio, firm tangibility, and firm Tobin's Q are all negative and statistically significant. These findings are consistent with conventional wisdom. For instance, if a firm has more tangible assets that can be used as collateral, banks are less likely to sell loans on this firm.
Next, the coefficients of lender-facility exposure and lender-borrower exposure are both positive and statistically significant. For each lender-facility pair, if the values of these variables are high, the bank is facing high funding pressure from the borrower of this facility. Therefore, the positive coefficients for these variables suggest that a bank's exposure cut on a facility is higher if the bank faces high funding pressure from the borrower this facility. Finally, the coefficient of agent lender is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the exposure cut by a facility's agent is smaller.
Overall, we find a positive correlation between banks' loan sales and firms' CDS trading status, and a negative correlation between banks' exposure cuts on credit line facilities and firms' CDS trading status. In addition, we find that banks' loan sales on CDS-active firms were smaller during and after the financial crisis than before the crisis. In regression (1), the coefficient of bank net CDS ratio is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that banks that hedge through CDS also tend to cut more exposures on loan facilities. On the other hand, the coefficient of Bank net CDS ratio*Credit line is negative and statistically significant, which suggest that banks using CDS hedging tend to cut less exposures on credit line facilities.
C. Comparing exposure cuts by different banks on the same facility
In regression (2), we include two dummy variables to control for the differences in exposure cuts during and after the financial crisis. As this regression shows, the coefficient of Bank net CDS ratio*Crisis is 0.607 and is statically significant. By contrast, the coefficient of bank net CDS ratio is reduced to 0.06 and is no longer statistically significant. Therefore, these results suggest the positive relationship between exposure cuts and bank hedging activities is concentrated in the crisis period.
The variable, bank RBCR, measures a bank's risk-based capital ratio. Therefore, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of bank RBCR suggests that banks are less likely to cut exposure when their risk based capital ratios are high. In other words, banks are under less pressure to sell loans to obtain capital relief if their capital ratios are high. Next, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of bank wholesale funding ratio suggests that a bank is less likely to sell loans if it has a stable channel of wholesale funding. The coefficients of other variables are largely consistent with existing theories.
D. Estimation results based on the secondary sample
In this subsection, we examine the effects of CDS trading on bank exposure cuts using the secondary sample. As described in Section 2, the secondary sample is at the lender-borrower For a lender-borrower pair in a given year, the net CDS buyer dummy equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection buyer on the borrower and zero otherwise. The dummy variable, net CDS seller, equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection seller on the borrower and zero otherwise.
Because the entire sample includes all lender-borrower pairs regardless of whether a lender holds CDS positions on a borrower, there are lender-borrower pairs in which a lender is neither a net CDS buyer nor a net CDS seller on the borrower. For this reason, we can include both net CDS buyer and net CDS seller dummies in the same regression. Finally, regression (4) adds borrower-level explanatory variables. All regressions include lendertime fixed effects, which are lender fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to absorb the combined effects of lender-side and macroeconomic variables.
The regression results in Table VI suggest that banks use CDS hedging to complement rather than to substitute for loan sales. Specifically, the coefficient of net CDS buyer is positive and statistically significant in all regressions, which suggests a bank's exposure cut on a firm is higher if it is a net CDS buyer on that firm. Furthermore, the coefficient of net CDS seller is positive and statistically significant in all regressions, suggesting that a bank's exposure cut on a borrower is also higher if it is a net CDS seller on the borrower. Therefore, this evidence is consistent with the notion that banks sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales. Table VII shows that a bank's exposure cut on a firm correlates positively with its sold CDS position on the same firm. This positive correlation seems to suggest that banks sell CDS protection as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales.
III. Conclusion
Both CDS and loan sales can be used to transfer risk or to obtain regulatory capital relief. For these purposes, banks can use CDS hedging to substitute for or to complement loan sales.
Tracking banks' lending exposures and CDS positions on individual firms, we observe that banks use CDS hedging to complement rather than to substitute for loan sales. In addition, loan sales can also be driven by funding purposes. We find a positive and significant correlation between a bank's exposure cut and its sold CDS protection on the same firm, which suggests that banks are likely to sell CDS as credit enhancements to facilitate loan sales to investors unwilling to hold credit risk. This dummy equals one if a facility has one of the following "criticized" internal risk ratings: "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful", and "loss".
Lender-Facility-Level Variables
Lender-facility exposure A lender's exposure to a facility is its share commitment to that facility (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). Share commitment is the maximum amount that a lender has legally committed to a syndicated credit facility according to the credit agreement. Exposure cut For a lender-facility pair in each year, this variable is the difference in a lender's exposure to a facility between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). Agent lender At the lender-facility level, this dummy indicates whether the lender is the agent for a given facility.
Lender-Borrower-Level Variables
Lender-borrower exposure For a lender-borrower pair in each quarter, this variable measures a lender's total syndicated lending exposure to the borrower (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). It equals the sum of a lender's used and unused syndicated lending commitments to a borrower. Exposure cut For a lender-borrower pair in each year, this variable is the sum of exposure cuts of all syndicated facilities of a lender-borrower pair between year t-1 and year t (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars).
High-risk internal rating
This indicator equals one if any facility of the borrower has one of the following "criticized" internal ratings: "special mention", "substandard", "doubtful", and "loss".
Agent lender
For a lender-borrower pair in each quarter, this dummy variable equals one if the lender is the syndication agent of the borrower in a syndicated facility Bought CDS protection For a lender-borrower pair in each quarter, this variable equals the notional amount of total CDS protection that the lender bought against the borrower (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars).
Sold CDS protection
For a lender-borrower pair in each quarter, this variable equals the notional amount of total CDS protection that the lender sold against the borrower (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars).
Net CDS protection
For a lender-borrower pair in each quarter, this variable is the difference between the bought CDS protection and the sold CDS protection (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars).
Net CDS buyer
For a lender-borrower pair in a given year, this dummy variable equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection buyer on the borrower and zero otherwise.
Net CDS seller
For a lender-borrower pair in a given year, this dummy variable equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection seller on the borrower and zero otherwise. The total assets of a firm (expressed in billions of U.S. dollars)
Borrower-Level Variables
Lender-Level Variables
Bank RBCR The bank's risk based capital (RBC) to total risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratio Bank NIM The bank's net interest margin Bank ROA The bank's return on assets Bank ROA volatility
The standard deviation of bank ROA over the past 8 quarters Bank NPA ratio The bank's non-performing assets to total assets ratio Bank wholesale funding ratio The sum of total borrowing and brokered deposits divided by the sum of total borrowing and deposits Bank net CDS ratio
The net notional amount of bought CDS protection to total assets ratio Bank securitized assets ratio Securitization balance to total assets ratio Bank size
The total assets of a bank (expressed in billions of U.S. dollars) Table I . Bank size and firm size are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. Lender-facility exposure, lender-borrower exposure, and lender exposure are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars. All other values are expressed in real value. "N" denotes number of observations; "Std" denotes standard deviation; "P5" and "P95" denote the 5th and 95th percentiles. Table I . Bank size and firm size are expressed in billions of U.S. dollars. Bought CDS protection, sold CDS protection, net CDS protection, exposure cut, and lending exposure are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars. All other values are expressed in real value. "N" denotes number of observations; "Std" denotes standard deviation; "P5" and "P95" denote the 5th and 95th percentiles. estimation results on the relationship between CDS trading and loan sales, by comparing exposure cuts on different facilities by the same lender in the same year. We include the lender-time fixed effects, which are lender fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved lender-level factors (time-invariant and time-varying), and macroeconomic factors. Consequently, lender-side and macroeconomic variables are excluded from regressions. The sample period is from 2001 to 2013. Variables are defined in Table I . The dependent variable is exposure cut, which is the difference in lender-facility exposure between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t for each lender-facility pair (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). The explanatory variables are observed at the end of year t-1. We construct two variables using the Markit CDS data. The first variable is CDS traded firm, a dummy variable created to control for time-invariant unobservable differences between CDS-referenced and non-CDS-referenced firms. The CDS traded firm dummy equals one for a firm in all years if any of the firm's debts was referenced in the CDS market at any time during the sample period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . The second variable is CDS active firm, which is designed to capture of the effects of CDS trading. The CDS active firm dummy equals one for a firm in a given year if any of the firm's debts was referenced in the CDS market during that year. Regression (1) is the baseline regression. Regression (2) controls for the differences over three sub-periods: before the crisis (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , during the crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) , and after the crisis (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Regression (3) controls for the differences between firms with and without investment grade ratings. Regression (4) controls for the differences between firms with and without pass internal ratings. Regression (5) controls for the differences between amended facilities and facilities that have not been amended. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. "N" denotes number of observations. estimation results on the relationship between CDS trading and loan sales, by comparing exposure cuts by different lenders on the same facility in the same year. We include the facility-time fixed effects, which are facility fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved facility-level factors, firm-level factors, and macroeconomic factors. Consequently, borrower-side and macroeconomic variables are excluded from the regressions. The sample period is from 2001 to 2013. Variables are defined in Table I . The dependent variable is exposure cut, which is the difference in lenderfacility exposure between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t for each lender-facility pair (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). The explanatory variables are observed at the end of year t-1.
Crisis Indicators
Regression (1) is the baseline regression. Regression (2) controls for differences over three sub-periods: before the crisis (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , during the crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) , and after the crisis (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. "N" denotes number of observations. estimation results on the relationship between CDS trading and loan sales, by comparing exposure cuts on different firms by the same lender in the same year, using a sample that links the SNC data with the DTCC data. The sample period is from 2010 to 2013. Variables are defined in Table I . The dependent variable is exposure cut, which is the difference in lender-borrower exposure between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t for each lenderborrower pair (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). The key explanatory variables are net CDS buyer and net CDS seller. For a lender-borrower pair in a given year, the dummy variable net CDS buyer equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection buyer on the borrower and zero otherwise. The dummy variable net CDS seller equals one if the lender is a net CDS protection seller on the borrower and zero otherwise. This table consists of 4 regressions. All regressions include the lender-time fixed effects, which are lender fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved lender-level factors (time-invariant and time-varying), and macroeconomic factors. Consequently, lender-side and macroeconomic variables are excluded from regressions. Regression (1) includes net CDS buyer and net CDS seller as the explanatory variables. Regression (2) adds agent lender and lenderborrower exposure to measure the lender-borrower relationship. Regression (3) adds high-risk internal rating to measure a lender's private information about a borrower. Regression (4) adds borrower-level explanatory variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. "N" denotes number of observations. estimation results on the relationship between CDS trading and loan sales, by comparing exposure cuts on different firms by the same lender in the same year, using a subsample of lender-borrower pairs in which the lender holds CDS positions on the borrower. The sample period is from 2010 to 2013. Variables are defined in Table I . The dependent variable is exposure cut, which is the difference in lender-borrower exposure between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t for each lender-borrower pair (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). The key explanatory variables are net CDS protection and sold CDS protection (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars). This table consists of 4 regressions. All regressions include the lendertime fixed effects, which are lender fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects, to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved lender-level factors (time-invariant and timevarying), and macroeconomic factors. Consequently, lender-side and macroeconomic variables are excluded from regressions. Regression (1) includes net CDS protection and sold CDS protection as the explanatory variables. Regression (2) adds agent lender and lender-borrower exposure to measure the lender-borrower relationship. Regression (3) adds high-risk internal rating to measure a lender's private information about a borrower. Regression (4) adds borrowerlevel explanatory variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. "N" denotes number of observations. 
